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COMMENTARY
Anna Gelpern*
INTRODUCTION
Enforceable promises discourage lying, cheating, and stealing. Contracts
that embody such promises shape institutions, distribute power, and organize
markets. The Smith-King critique of elite empirical contracts scholarship reveals a
field preoccupied with the first set of functions and barely interested in the second.
I am loath to second-guess this view without empirical evidence of my own.
Instead, I draw from it two sets of implications-one for the substantive study of
contracts, the other for the relationship between contract theory and contract
empiricism.
First, I suggest that organizational approaches enrich the study of public
aspects of private contracts, such as their import for nonparties, their role in social
ordering, and the political content of contracting practices. Second, I read Smith
and King's work as a useful reminder that the role of empirical study in contracts
goes beyond elaborating a fixed set of received theories. Real contracts teem with
big puzzles; it pays to search across disciplinary lines for ideas to solve them.
Part I of this Commentary highlights some of the important insights that
predicate the authors' turn to organizations. Their literature survey reveals both a
narrow range of motivating theories and a surprisingly confined view of the
empirical subject among contracts scholars. Smith and King seek to expand the
field of inquiry; and their effort resonates beyond the theories they propose. In Part
II, I sketch one context where organizational approaches might yield a payoff. My
goal is not to apply a particular theory, but to use a case study to imagine how a
Smith-King inspired literature might differ from the prevailing one. The over-the-
counter derivatives industry makes a fitting case study because its standard
contracts are drafted by a single organization and have an unusual modular
structure. A focus on organizations can shed new light on the implications of this
contract form for the drafter, the users, and the public. In Part III, I return to the
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relationship between contract theories and the study of contracts, and comment on
some methodological implications of Smith and King's insights.
I. MORE THAN SEVEN
Gordon Smith and Brayden King's article comprises two distinct
contributions: an empirical survey of elite contracts scholarship and a call to
expand its theoretical remit.' I address these in turn.
The first surprise in the Smith-King survey is just how few scholars,
especially those with legal training who publish in elite law reviews, invoke actual
contracts in their work. Over half a century into Karl Llewellyn's veneration of
contractual reality 2 and a decade into Lisa Bernstein's empirical challenge to
Llewellyn, 3 most law professors either predicate their conclusions on a stylized
understanding of contract documents or skip contracts altogether in favor of
contract doctrines and contracting practices. Although some writers implicitly
draw on experience with real contracts, Smith and King's strict filter-they count
only those articles that examine particular contracts-is a revealing proxy for the
reality quotient in scholarship.4 Scholars disagree about the content of contractual
reality and the extent to which it belongs in contract doctrine, but they seem to
agree that contracts are one part of contractual reality not worth studying.
Second, the dearth of contract documents in the studies of ostensibly
contractual relationships is especially puzzling. Stewart Macaulay's seminal
"preliminary" work on noncontractual business relations5 left a nagging question:
if businesspeople do in fact ignore written contracts, why do they pay so much to
have them produced, and spend so much time getting them (sort of) right?6 Smith
and King's results imply that Macaulay's work--and Llewellyn's and Bernstein's,
despite disagreements among them--is still taken as a mandate to look beyond
contracts to "real" business relations, leaving the contract puzzle to linger. Even
studies of interpretation and dispute resolution appear to gloss over the material
object of interpretation and dispute.7
1. See D. Gordon Smith & Brayden G. King, Contracts as Organizations, 51
ARiz. L. REv. 1, 23 (2009).
2. See generally Karl N. Llewellyn, The First Struggle to Unhorse Sales, 52
HARV. L. REv. 873 (1939) (arguing that the law of sales must reflect commercial reality).
3. Lisa Bernstein, The Questionable Empirical Basis of Article 2's
Incorporation Strategy: A Preliminary Study, 66 U. CHI. L. REV. 710, 714 (1999)
[hereinafter Bernstein, Questionable Empirical Basis]; see generally Lisa Bernstein,
Merchant Law in a Merchant Court: Rethinking the Code's Search for Immanent Business
Norms, 144 U. PA. L. REv. 1765 (1996) [hereinafter Bernstein, Merchant Law].
4. See Lee Epstein & Gary King, The Rules of Inference, 69 U. Cm. L. REV. 1,
2 (2002) (defining qualitative and quantitative empirical legal study).
5. Stewart Macaulay, Non-Contractual Relations in Business: A Preliminary
Study, 28 AM. Soc. REv. 55 (1963).
6. See generally Claire A. Hill, Why Contracts Are Written in "Legalese, " 77
Cm.-KENT L. REv. 59 (2001) (theorizing complex contract production in a law firm).
7. See generally Bernstein, Merchant Law, supra note 3. But see Mark C.
Weidemaier, Disputing Boilerplate, 82 TEMPLE L. REv. (forthcoming 2009) (a study of
dispute resolution provisions in sovereign debt contracts).
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Third, the way in which contracts appear in doctrinal debates is bound to
be peculiar because, even where literal contract language is present, it is at least
twice-removed from the contracting context: doctrine mediates judicial opinions,
which in turn mediate contract fragments made relevant by a given dispute. This
time-honored line of academic work still offers critical insights into the uses of
contract, but the disputing lens can only reveal a relatively small fraction of these
uses.
To be cautious, some of the survey results may be due to Smith and
King's decision to focus on top law and social science journals. On the one hand,
elite perspectives are both influential and revealing of the values in the scholarly
community. On the other, they may come with their own peculiar distortions.
Might top law journals publish fewer empirical studies of contracts than, for
example, empirical studies of the Supreme Court's constitutional jurisprudence?
Are established law journals more likely to have a relatively narrow view of
empiricism, 8 and more broadly, be less likely to innovate?9 Moreover, if such
journals publish more articles by professors at elite schools, and if such professors
are less likely to have drafted and negotiated contracts themselves, the journals
may publish fewer studies of actual contracts. Testing these questions would
require a different study and is unlikely to detract from the authors' core message.
So far, contracts appear as something of a doughnut hole: leading
scholarship revolves around the contract without elaborating it as such. Against
this background, the interest of economists and law-and-economists in the contract
form looks radical. The insight that parties might write their contracts a certain
way to obtain information or structure incentives lends itself directly to empirical
study. The questions might be straightforward--e.g., do parties in fact put
disciplining terms in their contracts, and do such terms in fact discipline?-but
they offer a testable way to connect contract form with its economic function.
Smith and King's project is part of the next generation of scholarship that
points to the need to broaden the inquiry further into the form and function of
contracts.' 0 Contracts may well do everything economists say they do; but at the
very least, they do a whole lot more.
The authors might be pleased-and justly so-if their lucid framing of
the four organizational theories were to inspire a crop of studies to supplement or
challenge the three dominant economic perspectives." But if that were all, I might
8. Epstein & King, supra note 4, at 1-2.
9. Research on innovation in corporate law, for example, suggests that more
established players are less likely to innovate. See generally Scott Baker & Kimberly D.
Krawiec, The Economics of Limited Liability: An Empirical Study of New York Law Firms,
2005 U. ILL. L. REv. 107 (2005); Michael J. Powell, Professional Innovation: Corporate
Lawyers and Private Lawmaking, 18 LAW. & SOC. INQUIRY 423 (1993).
10. ANNELISE RILES, COLLATERAL KNOWLEDGE: LEGAL REASON IN THE GLOBAL
FINANCIAL MARKETS (forthcoming) (manuscript at ch. 2, on file with author); Smith &
King, supra note 1, at 40; Mark C. Suchman, The Contract as Social Artifact, 37 LAW &
Soc'Y REV. 91, 92 (2003).
11. Cf Smith & King, supra note 1, at 23 ("We were pleased to find three
articles motivated at least in part by the organizational theories discussed ... below.").
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be a little disappointed: the article's contribution goes beyond growing the number
of explanatory theories in the contracts repertoire. Some of Smith and King's most
interesting insights are significant quite apart from the theoretical menu they
propose. They expose persistent gaps in contracts scholarship, gaps that separate
contracts, contracting, contracts doctrine, and contract theories. Describing
contracts as products and charters of organizations offers a holistic alternative. It
re-situates contracts as indispensable and multi-functional elements of social and
political systems, which are in turn indispensable to the study of contracts.
I find Smith and King's call to pluralism particularly compelling because
I have stumbled on debt contracts in my own work that seemed at once all-
important as public symbols and near-irrelevant as instruments to achieve their
stated private goals of deterring opportunism and establishing an orderly
renegotiation procedure. 12 The fact that nonparties appropriated the debt contracts
for their own purposes was intriguing, but hard to ground in established contract
theories. Looking at the same incident from an organizational perspective takes the
mystery out of nonparty interest: contracts are artifacts, resources, and public
goods. That a nonparty might wish to appropriate a contract form or any other
aspect of the contract seems natural, no less so than appropriating a tool or a
slogan. The next task is to figure out the nonparty's motivations, and how its
involvement might affect the contract, the parties, and the contracting practice.
II. PUBLIC PROMISES AND ORGANIZATIONAL AGENDAS
This Part imagines how Smith and King's view of contracts as
organizational devices might help frame the study of the global over-the-counter
(OTC) derivatives market, the institutional participants in this market, and the
contracts that govern their interactions.
A. Other People's Contracts: A Crisis Story
In October 1998, Japan nationalized Long-Term Credit Bank (LTCB),
once the ninth largest in the world. 13 The fall of LTCB marked a critical turn in
Japan's "lost decade." As bank failures accelerated, the authorities conceded for
the first time that a financial crisis was afoot, and that it warranted a
comprehensive response. But before they took over LTCB, Japanese officials
turned to the International Swaps and Derivatives Association (ISDA), a private
trade group with worldwide membership. The government wanted to be certain
that the way it went about nationalizing LTCB did not trigger termination under
ISDA agreements. 14
12. See generally Anna Gelpern & Mitu Gulati, Public Symbol in Private
Contract: A Case Study, 84 WASH. U. L. REV. 1627 (2006).
13. GILLIAN TETr, SAVING THE SuN: How WALL STREET MAVERICKS SHOOK UP
JAPAN'S FINANCIAL WORLD AND MADE BILLIONS xxii, 115 (2004) ("LTCB is ranked ninth
largest in the world by asset size, with a market capitalization several times that of
Citibank."); Hiroshi Nakaso, The Financial Crisis in Japan During the 1990s: How the
Bank of Japan Responded and the Lessons Learnt 12-13 (BIS Papers, Working Paper No.
6, Oct. 2001).
14. Nakaso, supra note 13 at 12-13.
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ISDA's standard forms governed thousands of LTCB contracts worth at
least $450 billion.1 5 The government wanted those contracts to go on performing;
however, the literal translation of its takeover authority ("special public
administration") could be read as an event of default in ISDA forms-a trigger that
gave counterparties an out. A rush of market participants closing out their LTCB
positions could unleash large-scale selling of yen-denominated assets, push down
the currency, push up interest rates, and disrupt already fragile markets. Working
closely with ISDA, government officials decided to use different language
("temporary nationalization") to describe its actions. ISDA then publicly endorsed
the approach with a statement on October 22, 1998-a private "no-action letter" of
sorts--that preempted a rush for the exits.1
6
In this episode, a nongovernmental organization that produces,
disseminates, interprets, and facilitates the enforcement of other people's contracts
assumed a regulatory role. Just as government regulators work with market
participants to interpret rules and create space for commercial activity, ISDA staff
collaborated with officials to interpret its contract form to create space for public
policy. The episode also highlights a public aspect of the contract itself ISDA's
boilerplate may have been perfectly suited for any given bilateral arrangement;
however, the fact that it was replicated in synchronous arrangements throughout
the financial markets--including "most of the major banks in the
world"' 7-- created negative externalities in the form of macroeconomic (here
exchange rate and interest rate) pressures. On the other hand, centralizing
interpretation authority in one governing body limited the spillover effects from
the boilerplate it had helped diffuse.
Contracts scholarship does not usually deal with nonparties and other
people's contracts. Mirroring contracts doctrine, 8 most scholars address
contracting parties, potential contracting parties,' 9 and judges dealing with parties.
In contrast, the interesting questions from the LTCB incident go to the role and
15. DAVID ANDREWS ET AL., FITCH RATINGS, BANK SUPPORT IN THE DEVELOPED
WORLD 14 (2002), available at http://www.fitchratingsasia.com/_uploadReport/
3357202223132493.pdf; TETT, supra note 13, at 114-15; Nakaso, supra note 13 at 12-13.
The figure represents notional principal outstanding. Notional figures may give a skewed
impression of the size of the market, since the payment obligations exchanged are usually
only a fraction of the notional amount used as the basis to calculate them.
16. ANDREWS ET AL., supra note 15, at 13-14; TETT, supra note 13, at 114-15;
Nakaso, supra note 13, at 12. See also Int 'l Swap Traders' Group Satisfied with Japan's
Help for LTCB, Jul PRESS TICKER SERVICE, Oct. 22, 1998, available at LEXIS, News &
Business, Individual Publications, JiJi Press Ticker Service.
17. TETT, supra note 13, at 114.
18. With reference to nonparties, the norm is embedded in doctrine-third party
beneficiaries are narrowly defined. See, e.g., RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS
§§ 302(2), 315 (2008); see also Martinez v. Socoma Cos., 521 P.2d 841, 843 (Cal. 1974)
(rejecting class action challenge to government contracts brought by targeted but still
"incidental" beneficiaries).
19. PATRICK BOLTON & MATHIAS DEWATRIPONT, CONTRACT THEORY 608-11,
642 (2005).
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incentives of the nonparty drafter, nonjudicial interpreter, and nongovernmental
enforcer.
B. Outward-Looking Contract Design
That private contracts have a public dimension is hardly novel. However,
legal scholars tend to take a relatively narrow view of this dimension: contracts
"become public" when courts side with one or another party, putting the power of
the state behind its privately negotiated position.20
Reality is richer. The organizational functions of contract in the Smith-
King article highlight some of the more subtle public aspects of private promises.
In the resource-based view (RBV), contracts secure competitive advantage. The
objective of contract design, at least in part, is to shape the market in which
contracting parties operate, not just--perhaps not even first--the relationship
between them.21 Learning theories, already popular in the vast "boilerplate"
literature, point to more public effects: contracts embody, disseminate, and
entrench collective knowledge at the level of a single firm or a large population.
Where contractual routines are pervasive, interdependent, and "sticky, ' '23 they can
result not only in suboptimal private arrangements (the focus of "stickiness"
studies), but also in suboptimal market structures.24 The capacity of contracts to
shape and communicate group identity, and to express and maintain standards of
legitimacy, reveals their importance in social ordering.
The market-structuring, knowledge-spreading, self-constituting, and
standard-setting capacities of the contract form make it valuable for many actors
outside the contracting relationship, provided they can find ways to deploy other
people's contracts to advance their own purposes, which may be instrumental or
symbolic. Conceived as an organizational device, the contract has more uses and
a broader universe of potential users than is generally supposed. The next two
Sections suggest how this insight might contribute to the study of derivatives
contracts and the markets in which they operate.
20. See generally Daniela Caruso, Contract Law and Distribution in the Age of
Welfare Reform, 49 ARIZ. L. REv. 665 (2007); Duncan Kennedy, From the Will Theory to
the Principle of Private Autonomy: Lon Fuller's "Consideration and Form, " 100 COLUM.
L. REv. 94 (2000); Peer Zumbansen, The Law of Society: Governance Through Contract, 14
IND. J. GLOBAL LEGAL STUD. 191 (2007).
21. Compare Lon L. Fuller, Consideration and Form, 41 COLUM. L. REv. 799,
801-03 (1941) (discussing what Fuller calls the "channeling" function, also discussed in
Kennedy, supra note 20, at 102-04), with Philippe Aghion & Patrick Bolton, Contracts as a
Barrier to Entry, 77 AM. ECON. REv. 388 (1987).
22. E.g., Omri Ben-Shahar, Foreword to "Boilerplate ": Foundations of Market
Contracts Symposium, 104 MICH. L. REv. 821 (2006); Marcel Kahan & Michael Klausner,
Standardization and Innovation in Corporate Contracting (or "The Economics of
Boilerplate'), 83 VA. L. REv. 713 (1997).
23. E.g., Omri Ben-Shahar & John A. E. Pottow, On the Stickiness of Default
Rules, 33 FLA. ST. U. L. REv. 651 (2006).
24. Gelpem & Gulati, supra note 12, at 1651-52 (discussing the perceived need
for government involvement due to market-wide contract inflexibility).
25. See id. at 1713-14.
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C. Contract Makes Market
This Section describes ISDA, its contracts, its contract-drafting and
related activities as subjects of an organizational inquiry. The next section sketches
out potential avenues for analysis.
ISDA emerged in 1985 from a series of meetings among eighteen large
financial intermediaries and four law firms, gathered to distill a common
vocabulary for privately traded derivatives contracts.26 When asked about the
group's origins, lawyers in the industry volunteer apocryphal stories of the months
it took to bring early contracts to fruition, and of legendary men taking the
Concorde to attend lavish closings in London. Today's deals take seconds, in large
part thanks to ISDA's standardization work.
When the Japanese government took over LTCB in October 1998, the
global OTC derivatives market stood at $72 trillion, as traditionally measured by
the notional amounts outstanding. 27 By the summer of 2008, it had surpassed $680
trillion.28 In 1998, ISDA had over 360 members worldwide; at this writing they
have more than 800.29 Intermediaries, or dealers-large financial institutions,
investment and, increasingly, commercial banks30--remain the largest and most
active constituency. However, in recent years the group has steadily expanded to
end-users (for example, industrial companies hedging risk) and service providers,
such as law firms and technology specialists. Despite, or in response to, early
criticism of pro-dealer bias, the aspiration of universal membership has become
entrenched.31 During the summer of 2008, ISDA had a staff of about seventy, most
26. ANTHONY C. GOOCH & LINDA B. KLEIN, DOCUMENTATION FOR DERIVATIVES
18-19 (4th ed. 2002); ALLEN & OVERY, AN INTRODUCTION TO THE DOCUMENTATION OF OTC
DERIVATIVES: "TEN THEMES" 3 (May 2002), available at http://www.isda.org/educat/
pdf/ten-themes.pdf. Kimberly Krawiec offers a pithy and useful definition of derivatives as
"bilateral contract[s] or payment exchange agreement[s] whose value is linked to, or derived
from, an underlying asset (such as a currency, commodity or stock), reference rate (such as
the Treasury Rate, the Federal Funds Rate or LIBOR), or index (such as the S&P 500)."
Kimberly D. Krawiec, More than Just "New Financial Bingo": A Risk-Based Approach to
Understanding Derivatives, 23 J. CORP. L. 1, 6 (1997). Derivatives fall into one of two
categories: "those ... that are standardized and actively traded on exchanges ... and those
that are customized for the specific needs of a particular investor." Id at 7. This
Commentary focuses on the latter category-known as "over-the-counter (OTC)
derivatives"--which are typically not exchange-traded, and not regulated. Id. at 7-8.
27. See Bank for Int'l Settlements, Semiannual Amounts Outstanding of Over-
the-Counter (OTC) Derivatives, http://www.bis.org/statistics/otcder/dtl920a.csv (last
visited Feb. 19, 2009) (CSV data, not html format).
28. Bank for Int'l Settlements, Amounts Outstanding of Over-the-Counter
(OTC) Derivatives, http://www.bis.org/statistics/otcder/dtl920a.pdf.
29. About ISDA, http://www.isda.org/wwa/wwanav.html (last visited Feb. 4,
2009); A Retrospective of ISDA's Activities 1999, at 1-2, http://www.isda.org/wwa/
Retrospective 1999_Master.pdf.
30. See generally Saule T. Omarova, The Quiet Metamorphosis: How Financial
Derivatives Changed the "Business of Banking" (2009) (unpublished manuscript, on file
with author).
31. As this issue went to press, ISDA added three nondealer members to its
board for the first time. ISDA News Release, ISDA Adds New Perspective to Its Board with
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of them in New York and London.32 Although the group has only a handful of
legal staff, trained lawyers also work in its regulatory and tax departments. A
significant part of the staff is dedicated to staging over a hundred conferences
every year worldwide.
The group's first product was the Code of Standard Wording,
Assumptions and Provisions for Swaps ("Swaps Code"), released in 1985. The
Code-a compendium of terms-directly responded to industry demand for a
"common vocabulary." A simple form contract for currency and interest-rate
swaps followed in 1987.
Today's modular architecture of ISDA documentation emerged in the
early 1990s.3 3 A standard-form Master Agreement written to work under U.S. or
English law was first released in 1992. 34 The Master is neither product- nor party-
specific; it is designed as the fixed generic core of every trading relationship,
which may last for ten to fifteen years. 35 It links to other, more tailored, modules
by reference.3 6 Prospective counterparties supplement this core with a Schedule,
which addresses credit and legal risks specific to the contracting firms, but is not
product-specific. 37 A Credit Support Annex governs collateral arrangements
between the parties.3 8 Definitions booklets, direct successors to the Swaps Code,
are product-specific collections of standard terms promulgated by ISDA and
incorporated by reference in individual transactions.3 9 Short-form Confirmations
set out the terms of individual transactions between specific parties; they
incorporate the relevant Definitions by reference. 40 Long-form Confirmations are
more elaborate; they are used between parties that have no Master in place, as well
as for new products where ISDA is yet to promulgate definitions.41 Long-form
Confirmations still incorporate standard ISDA terms by reference, but the result is
customized to the transaction.42 User's Guides to ISDA documentation, true to
their name, explain the contracts.43
Three Buy-Side Representatives (Feb. 19, 2009), http://www.isda.org/press/
press021909bod.html.
32. ISDA Staff Information, http://isda.org/wwalstaff.html (last visited Feb. 5,
2009). It also has offices in the District of Columbia, Brussels, Singapore, Hong Kong, and
Tokyo. Id.
33. See, e.g., ALLEN & OVERY, supra note 26, at 2. Several lawyers involved in
the early days of ISDA form design reported that this architecture was inspired by standard-
form loan documents of the World Bank, a big and early end user.
34. Id.
35. See id. at 3.
36. See id.
37. See id.
38. See id. at 4-5.
39. See id. at 3-4.
40. Id. at 3.
41. Id.
42. See id.
43. See id. at 5.
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A combination of Schedules, Annexes, and Confirmations effectively
modifies the Master to fit particular parties and transactions. 44 Institutions adopt
the framework voluntarily, and are free to vary any part.45 Some institutions write
their own masters and modules to suit their organizational or transactional needs.46
However, even those that customize tend to retain the modular structure.47
On occasion, the legal or economic landscape shifts enough to prompt
market-wide amendment of the Master, though not enough to warrant its total
overhaul.48 ISDA's Protocols centralize the amendment procedure. The group puts
forward new terms and invites members to accede to them by filing a letter with
ISDA. When two firms have filed accession papers, the Protocol's amendments
become binding between them. 49 This process is similar to treaty accession
practice under public international law, where the United Nations commonly
serves as the repository of state accession instruments.
This standard-form architecture is obviously different from the bespoke
contract archetype that dominates first-year contracts textbooks. It also stands
apart from the more "modem" images of contract boilerplate, either as pre-printed
text with a few hand-inked "dickered terms," or as massive corporate tomes
iterated from deal to deal with minor tweaks. In the OTC derivatives market,
people entering into the economic deal do not simply gloss over small print
legalese at closing; they may never see it at all. Their firms likely bound
themselves to the contracting framework through separate institutional (usually
legal) channels. Contracting is literally "disaggregated.
'50
ISDA's contracts are the work of a documentation committee. At about
3000 people, it is by far the largest of the membership committees. But only a
subset of committee members (usually representing dealers and the largest
investors) participate actively in the drafting. The work is coordinated by ISDA
staff, often with input from outside experts. S
Decisions to develop standard forms for new products, to amend existing
forms, and to intervene in legislative or judicial matters are made by ISDA
management in consultation with members and outside experts, often in response
44. See generally id
45. See id at 3.
46. See id
47. See id at 2.
48. ISDA promulgated a new Master Agreement in 2002. ISDA Master
Agreements and Bridges, http://www.isda.org/publications/isdamasteragrmnt.html (last
visited Feb. 22, 2009). Many nondealers continue to use the 1992 version because they
consider the new one too dealer-friendly. Lauren Teigland-Hunt & GuyLaine Charles, The
Evolution of Standardization in the OTC Derivatives Market, MFA REP., Jan.-Feb. 2009, at
3.
49. See ALLEN & OVERY, supra note 26, at 6-7; ISDA 2002 Master Agreement
Protocol (July 15, 2003), available at http://www.isda.org/2002masterprot/docs/
2002Protocol.doc.
50. Choi and Gulati used the term as a metaphor. Stephen J. Choi & G. Mitu
Gulati, Contract as Statute, 104 MICH. L. REv. 1129, 1172 (2006).
51. This is a typical production pattern for nonprofits. See Kevin E. Davis, The
Role of Nonprofits in the Production of Boilerplate, 104 MICH. L. REv. 1075, 1081 (2006).
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to member initiative. Information is disseminated among members; however,
decision-making procedures appear to be informal--consultation and consensus
prevail over ballots and ceremony. According to staff and outside lawyers involved
in the drafting process, the group has traditionally waited for the market to gain
experience with a product before reducing it to a standard form. In recent years,
members have increasingly turned to ISDA for documentation soon after a product
has been launched.
ISDA copyrights its documentation12 and derives revenue from it. Several
industry lawyers have described the copyright-holding function as a central
justification for ISDA's existence. The drafting monopoly in turn gives ISDA
voice in the interpretation and enforcement of its contracts worldwide, and
ultimately, political power--most apparent in its influence over financial market
regulation.
53
ISDA has sought favorable legal, regulatory, and judicial treatment for its
contracts.54 It has worked to exempt them from oversight by securities and
commodities market regulators, 55 and has succeeded in shielding them from public
interference in bankruptcy. Derivatives contracts are generally 56 exempt from the
bankruptcy stay on creditor enforcement and fraudulent conveyance rules, among
others.57 While all other contracts remain frozen, the exemption lets counterparties
under derivatives contracts net aggregate exposure to the insolvent firm,
presumably protecting the markets at the expense of the bankruptcy estate.
Because bankruptcy and secured credit laws cannot be fully disclaimed by
52. ISDA Publications, Frequently Asked Questions on Copyright,
http://www.isda.org/publications/pdf/FAQs-on-Copyright.pdf (last visited Feb. 5, 2009).
53. Frank Partnoy refers to something like this effect as a "second-order benefit"
from ISDA's status as a standard-setter in the OTC derivatives industry. Frank Partnoy,
Second-Order Benefits from Standards, 48 B.C. L. REV. 169, 171, 187-89 (2007). However,
he focuses on second-order benefits to ISDA's membership, for example, in the form of
preferential access to information. My interest is in benefits to ISDA.
54. See, e.g., FRANK PARTNOY, INFECTIOUS GREED: How DECEIT AND RISK
CORRUPTED THE FINANCIAL MARKETS 152-54 (2004).
55. See, e.g., Commodity Futures Modernization Act of 2000, Pub. L. No. 106-
554, 114 Stat. 2763 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 7 U.S.C.); PRESIDENT'S
WORKING GROUP ON FIN. MKTS., HEDGE FUNDS, LEVERAGE, AND THE LESSONS OF LONG-
TERM CAPITAL MANAGEMENT (1999), available at http://www.ustreas.gov/press/releases/
reports/hedgfund.pdf; Frank Partnoy, 1SDA, NASD, CFMA, and SDNY: The Four Horsemen
of Derivatives Regulation?, in BROOKINGS-WHARTON PAPERS ON FINANCIAL SERVICES 213
(Robert E. Litan & Richard Herring eds., 2002).
56. In 2005, the U.S. Bankruptcy Code was revised to expand the universe of
exempted contracts, constrain judicial discretion and encourage judicial deference to
industry views. Edward R. Morrison & Joerg Riegel, Financial Contracts and the New
Bankruptcy Code: Insulating Markets form Bankrupt Debtors and Bankruptcy Judges, 13
AM. BANKR. INST. L. REV. 641, 641-44 (2005); see also Stephen J. Lubben, Credit
Derivatives and the Future of Chapter 11, 81 AM. BANKR. L.J. 405 (2007).
57. This prevents the trustee from collecting on contracts where the estate stands
to gain, while repudiating payment obligations to the same counterparties. See generally
Bankruptcy Abuse Prevention and Consumer Protection Act of 2005, Pub. L. No. 109-8,
119 Stat. 23 (codified as amended in scattered sections oft 1 U.S.C.).
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contract, ISDA has sought clarifications and changes in the law to permit
bankruptcy netting in multiple jurisdictions, and it has obtained legal opinions
from local counsel in over forty countries attesting to the enforceability of netting
provisions in their contracts. 58 Only members may rely on these opinions.
ISDA's amicus brief practice grows out of its contract drafting work.
Most of its interventions are in regulatory and bankruptcy settings, where the
group has essentially reiterated its positions against regulation and for netting,
siding with members against regulators and trustees.59 ISDA's interventions in
basic contract disputes are relatively rare, partly because it is loath to come in
against members, even as its membership becomes close to universal. When it
does participate, ISDA has tended to favor strict textualist interpretation. Its
litigation posture and legislative strategy alike seek to minimize the scope for
judicial discretion and functional analysis; the role of the courts in this view is to
give effect to ISDA contracts as authoritative "codification" 60 of market practice.
ISDA has been increasingly active in developing procedures, such as
auctions, to facilitate orderly settlement in the market where a major counterparty,
ranging from Lehman Brothers to the Republic of Ecuador, is in distress.6" This
role follows naturally from its drafting and legislative posture (implementing
netting). It also extends ISDA's remit beyond interpretation, which drove the
LTCB incident, into more structural aspects of the derivatives market.
The next Section revisits this landscape using Smith and King's
organizational insights.
D. Organizational Agendas
Contracts scholars often ask what trade groups do for contracts-how
they improve drafting,62 respond to legal shocks,63 and resolve interpretation
58. Annelise Riles, The Transnational Appeal of Formalism: The Case of
Japan's Netting Law 20 & n.91 (Stanford/Yale Junior Faculty Forum, Research Paper No.
00-03, 2000), available at http://papers.ssm.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract id=162588;
ISDA, Status of Netting Legislation, http://www.isda.org/docproj/ stat of net leg.html (last
visited Feb. 5, 2009).
59. See ISDA, Legal Resources-Amicus Briefs, http://www.isda.org/ (last
visited Feb. 19, 2009).
60. Brief for International Swaps and Derivatives Association, as Amicus Curiae
Supporting Defendant-Appellant at 4-5, AON Fin. Prods., Inc. v. Soci6t6 Gn6rale, 476
F.3d 90 (2d Cir. 2007) (No. 06-1080-CV), available at www.isda.org/speeches/pdf/ISDA-
Amicus-Curiae-Brief05-08-06.pdf.
61. See, e.g., ISDA, PLAIN ENGLISH SUMMARY OF THE AUCTION METHODOLOGY
IN THE 2009 ECUADOR CDS PROTOCOL, available at http://www.isda.org/
2009ecuadorcdsprot/docs/Ecuador-Plain-English-Summary.pdf; ISDA, Press Release,
Success of ISDA Protocal Series Continues, ISDA Launches Washington Mutual Protocal
(Oct. 16, 2008), available at http://www.isda.org/press/press 101608.html.
62. See Davis, supra note 51, passim (arguing among other advantages that
nonprofits have a cost advantage at preparing and disseminating contract boilerplate, and
may produce more even-handed terms).
63. See Choi & Gulati, supra note 50, at 1158-59 (citing ISDA's quasi-
legislative response to a federal court's interpretation of its restructuring credit event in
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disputes. 4 Reflecting back on the role that contracts play in constituting and
motivating industry groups is different. This line of inquiry goes to group
incentives, decision-making, legitimacy, and authority, and in turn helps
contextualize the form and content of the contract. Without it, a judge or policy
maker who turns to an industry group for insight to interpret or regulate has only
partial information to guide her deference.
65
Deference to trade usage, real or imagined, is embedded in contract law.66
Courts and scholars--even scholars who doubt the wisdom of court recourse to
trade usage--traditionally treat trade groups as repositories of trade usage. Recent
scholarship highlights two aspects of trade group involvement in contract practice.
First, new formalists 67 ask whether businesspeople that operate in norm-rich
communities prefer public courts to discover and apply community norms, or to
enforce their contracts as written. 68 This scholarship addresses the existence and
role of norms in commercial relationships. A more recent crop of studies appraises
welfare gains from having third parties, especially nonprofits, draft standard-form
contracts for the broader markets. The verdict is positive: in addition to
aggregating and disseminating trade norms, groups can offer economies of scale,
promote learning, overcome stickiness, and, especially where they have broad
membership, reduce the scope for advantage-taking.
69
There is no reason to doubt that group involvement has all of the above
and other advantages. It is equally plausible and not at all contradictory to suppose
Eternity Global Master Fund Ltd. v. Morgan Guaranty Trust Co. of N.Y & J.P. Morgan
Chase Bank, 375 F.3d 168 (2d Cir. 2004)).
64. See generally Bernstein, Merchant Law, supra note 3 (discussing contract
interpretation by private industry tribunals).
65. Questions of group motive/incentives have been raised in other settings, for
example, in studies of interest group litigation. See, e.g., Lee Epstein, Courts and Interest
Groups, in THE AMERICAN COURTS: A CRITICAL ASSESSMENT 335, 363 (John B. Gates &
Charles A. Johnson eds., 1991); Suzanne B. Goldberg, Intersectionality in Theory and
Practice, in INTERSECTIONALITY AND BEYOND: LAW, POWER AND THE POLITICS OF LOCATION
124, 144 (Emily Grabham et al. eds., 2009).
66. UCC section 1-103(a)(2) (2007) states that the purpose of the Act is "to
permit the continued expansion of commercial practices through custom, usage, and
agreement of the parties." Other sections of the Code share this emphasis on the import of
trade. See, e.g., § 1-303(c)-(e). Scholars have challenged the Code's incorporation of trade
usage, arguing among other things that uniform usage does not exist, or cannot or should
not be determined by the courts. See, e.g., Bernstein, Merchant Law, supra note 3;
Bernstein, Questionable Empirical Basis, supra note 3; Richard Craswell, Do Trade
Customs Exist?, in THE JURISPRUDENTIAL FOUNDATIONS OF CORPORATE AND COMMERCIAL
LAW 118 (Jody S. Kraus & Steven D. Walt eds., 2000).
67. Richard H. Pildes, Forms of Formalism, 66 U. CHI. L. REv. 607, 619-21
(1999).
68. See generally Bernstein, Merchant Lar, supra note 3; Alan Schwartz &
Robert E. Scott, Contract Theory and the Limits of Contract Law, 113 YALE L.J. 541
(2003).
69. Organizations whose members include both sides of a transaction produce
more even-handed forms to please the membership as a whole. Davis, supra note 51, at
1085-88.
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that trade groups have private objectives apart from the welfare of their members
and the health of their markets, and that these objectives (which need not be
devious) might influence the groups' work with contracts.
This relative reluctance of contracts literature to delve into group
motivations does not stem from innocence. For example, when comparing form
contracts to statutes, and trade groups to legislatures, Stephen Choi and Mitu
Gulati acknowledge the possibility that some groups may be
problematic--unrepresentative, wayward, or just plain sloppy.70 Similarly, in his
assessment of nonprofits' role in contract drafting, Kevin Davis allows for
unrepresentative groups and conflict among groups. 71 But the goal in both projects
72is to isolate the potential role of an ideal group type in contract practice, not to
examine the role of contracts in the operation of real groups. The fact that Choi
and Gulati, writing about ISDA, appear to take its broad membership, longevity,
and market share as prima facie evidence of legitimacy is tangential to their
argument. The right sort of group can testify to the original public meaning of a
contract; ISDA looks good, but is not indispensable. Similarly, Davis's working
assumption that nonprofits' contract practice follows their stated missions is there
to highlight the gap between generic nonprofits and others, not as an empirical
assertion about how any given nonprofit reconciles its institutional goals with
those of its members.
Smith and King's organizational approach invites a flipping of the lens.
The question becomes: how do ISDA-drafted contracts--their modular form, the
process of their production, the way in which courts interpret them, and the degree
of variation or customization in the market-relate to ISDA's organizational
objectives? And how do the form contract infrastructure and the institutional
landscape dominated by ISDA impact the contracting parties' organizational
arrangements? The following are a few of the possible research questions that
might follow from this shift in focus.
1. What are the implications of modular contracts and centralized
drafting for the OTC derivatives market and for ISDA?
The modular, trans-jurisdictional, and cross-product design of ISDA's
contracts has brought a large number of long-term relationships among financial
firms worldwide under its documentation umbrella. This has both positive and
negative externalities. On the one hand, the market may benefit from having a
single predictable regime to govern many complex, specialized contracts.
Moreover, in a netting world, it is hard to find a principled reason to exempt some
financial contracts but not others from bilateral closeout arrangements. On the
other hand, the push to fit more products under one roof for the sake of
70. Choi & Gulati, supra note 50, passim. Their response is to privilege the
groups' quasi-public drafting history in judicial contract interpretation. A historical
approach requires groups to formalize the process that results in a new interpretation. Id at
55.
71. Davis, supra note 51, at 1088-89.
72. The role would likely be usage aggregators for Choi & Gulati, see generally
Choi & Gulati, supra note 50, and nonprofits for Davis, see generally Davis, supra note 51.
20091
ARIZONA LAW REVIEW
organizational efficiency or market share may obscure real economic differences.
73
Physical disaggregation of contracting, discussed more below, potentially
separates the people who understand the economics of a financial product from
those who understand its legal structure; it creates new sources of risk that need to
be managed.
In addition, even nimble organizations can become path dependent, while
organizations with diverse memberships can become paralyzed by internal
conflicts. Whether trade group inertia is less frequent or less problematic than
coordination failures in atomistic contracting is an open question that can be
tested. From a policy perspective, documenting a wide range of diverse financial
products as swaps may limit the reach of formal regulation 74 and may create a
parallel bankruptcy system for financial firms, not just a subset of financial
products, with implications for global financial stability. The LTCB incident
illustrates the potential.
2. What is the relationship between contract interpretation strategies and
governance in the business community?
Derivatives trading is rife with informality. 75 Parties' business practices
routinely depart from their contracts for business, tax, regulatory, and any number
of other reasons. Yet ISDA's legislative and litigation posture has steadfastly
discouraged functional and contextual analysis of its contracts by judges. This may
be justified by financial complexity (polite proxy for judicial ineptitude).7 6 But in
such cases textualism also serves an independent governance function: it asks the
court to fix and police the outer boundary of private regulation, not to interfere in
its substance, which remains in ISDA's domain. Two implications follow. First,
when courts choose interpretation strategies in financial contract disputes, they are
allocating power between the public and private spheres, and within the private
sphere. Second, a court's choice of textualism in deference to trade group amici
implies a view of their governance role-not just their technical expertise. Under
the circumstances, a court may pursue an administrative-style inquiry into the
group's representative character, internal processes, and other factors affecting
legitimacy, including novel ones, such as the extent of competition among private
73. See generally Michael Simkovic, Secret Liens and the Financial Crisis of
2008 (Jan. 4, 2009), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstractid=
1323190 (observing that market participants document a wide range of economic
arrangements as swaps to take advantage of their favorable treatment in bankruptcy).
74. See Edward R. Morrison & Joerg Riegel, Financial Contracts and the New
Bankruptcy Code: Insulating Markets from Bankrupt Debtors and Bankruptcy Judges, 13
AM. BANKR. INST. L. REv. 641, 641-42 (2005).
75. See generally Deutsche Bank AG v. AMBAC Credit Prods., No. 04 Civ.
5594, 2006 WL 1867497, at *12-14 (S.D.N.Y. 2006) (considering evidence of informality
in the settlement of derivatives transactions); Alex Raskolnikov, The Cost of Norms: Tax
Effects of Tacit Understandings, 74 U. CHI. L. REv. 601,623-25 (2007).
76. Choi & Gulati, supra note 50, at 1130-33; Morrison & Riegel, supra note
74, at 643-44. Cf Bernstein, Merchant Courts, supra note 3; David Chamy, The New
Formalism in Contract, 66 U. CHI. L. REv. 842, 848 (1999) (examining the relationship
between formalism and judicial expertise); Craswell, supra note 66.
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standard setters." This may partly displace traditional inquiries into the particular
intent of the contracting parties or the optimal design of incentives in a given
business context.78
3. How does the architecture of a form contract affect the contract user's
organization?
The modular form of ISDA's contracts may reinforce specialization in
financial firms. Traders may never see the legal terms of a Master Agreement;
however, they alone may see transaction confirmations, which incorporate the
Master by reference. Lawyers may have only limited exposure to the economic
terms. This compartmentalizes knowledge. The old parable of people groping
different parts of an elephant in a dark room illustrates the risk: absent measures to
the contrary, few within the user organization may have a view of the entire
contractual arrangement, or have the capacity to respond to shocks.
Compartmentalization can increase the cost of drafting mistakes: for example,
putting relationship-relevant terms into a confirmation, or deal-relevant terms into
the Master, risks having these terms overlooked and may render them ineffective.
An organization must devise procedures to address the risks that arise from using
modular contracts.
In sum, ISDA's contract structures, as well as its predilection for
formalism, are obviously successful and eminently rational--especially in a
rapidly growing market. However, they also have consequences for the structure
and politics of the marketplace. Treating the contract-drafting organization as a
black box risks missing important costs and benefits of its involvement.
Traditional public choice analysis 79 can go a long way to explain ISDA's positions
and shed light on contracting practices among sophisticated business people 80 in
the OTC derivatives world. But organizational theories, along with sociological
8
'
and anthropological 82 theories about knowledge, identify the subject of ISDA
contracts as public in the first place.
III. CONTRACT THEORY AND CONTRACT EMPIRICISM
The previous Part imagined OTC derivatives contracts as a field for
organizational study. This Part briefly returns to empirical methodology. Smith
and King's literature survey suggests that today's empirical contracts scholars
engage in a series of statistical up-or-down tests of narrow theoretical propositions,
drawn from a limited number of economic theories. This approach is in contrast to
famous qualitative studies noted earlier, including those by Macaulay, who went
out to see if his contracts textbook had any relevance in the business world, and
77. Cf David V. Snyder, Private Lawmaking, 64 OHIO ST. L.J. 371, 446 (2003)
(addressing the role of competition in private lawmaking).
78. Cf Choi & Gulati, supra note 50, at 1131 (proposing an alternative contract
interpretation strategy).
79. See Robert E. Scott, The Politics of Article 9, 80 VA. L. REv. 1783, 1805-06
(1994) (using public choice to explain UCC politics).
80. See Schwartz & Scott, supra note 68, at 544.
81. See generally Suchman, supra note 10.
82. See generally RILES, supra note 10.
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found out that it had little to none. More recently, Bernstein went out in search of
Llewellyn's custom among diamond, cotton, and grain merchants, and found a
contracting universe quite different from the UCC predicate. It is true and
significant that many of the qualitative scholars have deliberately avoided
contracts; the point was to find out what else determines business relationships.
But the resulting empirical contracts literature looks odd: comprising
statistical studies of contracts and qualitative studies of relationships,
substantively and methodologically apart.
Because Smith and King's organizational approach is at once cognizant
of actual contracts and of their thick social setting, it is well placed to bridge the
gaps between quantitative and qualitative, contracts and contracting studies. For
example, it is difficult to see how one might discern the role of contracts in
organizations without asking the people involved in the production and use of the
contracts what it all means to them. Their answers may be misleading and self-
serving-but the fact that informants would care enough to mislead is revealing, as
is the way in which they do. Research questions of the sort raised in Part II of this
Commentary lend themselves naturally to case studies and thick description, at
least to supplement, if not partially displace, statistical analysis.
Qualitative inquiry might reveal diverse economic arrangements behind a
single legal form, organizations' motives for getting involved in disputes and
adopting certain interpretation strategies over others, and how such strategies are
received in different parts of the market. Ethnographies of the documentation
setting 83 are especially helpful because they shed light on the full complex of
social structures, artifacts, and individual incentives as framed by these structures.
On the other hand, statistical studies may test how well traders as a group
understand the legal framework of their transactions, and may offer insight on
compartmentalization of knowledge.
At the risk of reading too much into the organizational agenda, I see it
pointing to a substantive and methodological pluralism that still holds the potential
of producing disciplined theoretical and empirical contributions.
CONCLUSION
The mainstream "constitutional" view of contracts has them as vehicles
for power dispersion.84 This conclusion is intuitive where contracting is dispersed:
private parties compete 85 in creating private law. Contract doctrine may check
power disparities at the edges, 86 but it leaves the essential premise unchallenged
-perhaps even reinforced. An organizational approach has the potential to change
the calculus.
83. See, e.g., Annelise Riles, The Anti-Network: Private Global Governance,
Legal Knowledge, and the Legitimacy of the State, 56 AM. J. COMP. L. 605 (2008); RILES,
supra note 10.
84. Harry W. Jones, The Jurisprudence of Contracts, 44 U. CN. L. REv 43, 50-
54 (1975).
85. Snyder, supra note 77, at 374.
86. Doctrines ranging from (old) consideration to (new) unconscionability
perform this function.
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Asking what contracts do for organizations puts the organizations'
agendas at the center of empirical inquiry. It invites the study of the political
economy of contracts, the role of contracts in social ordering, and the production
of knowledge. Knowing this role and the much broader social, cultural, and
political significance of contracts should in turn inform their regulation and
adjudication. To the extent anyone had ever looked at contracts solely as bilateral
anti-cheating devices, that view is increasingly hard to sustain.
The relationship between contracts and contract-drafting trade
associations is a case in point. In the traditional view, trade associations channel
their membership's contracting druthers. An organizational study might ask how a
given contract form might benefit the trade group, how the group's own
preferences might affect the contract, and how the contract might in turn shape the
contracting organizations.
At about the time that the Japanese government officials worked on the
LTCB takeover with ISDA staff, David Charny wrote in a comment on Lisa
Bernstein's article, that "[t]he work of the trade associations might best be
understood as an attempt to accelerate--or to substitute for-the more spontaneous
development" of business custom. 87 He went on to link the contract work of trade
groups with the work of other private standard setters, which "points to substantial
reason to fear rent-seeking behavior and sheer irrationality or arbitrariness" on the
part of the standard setters, who often have considerable power to discipline their
own.8 8 Foreshadowing the more recent scholarship on "bottom-up" private
lawmaking,89 he observed rather darkly:
When one considers the elaborate apparatus by which the trade
associations formulate and enforce customs ... one is reminded of
nothing so much as of Foucault's image of modem disciplinary
institutions, which continuously survey and monitor their members
and subject them to routines of training and discipline .... We are at
this point quite far from the world of Llewellyn and Hayek, in
which the immanent practices of business persons arise inductively
as they generalize from their own day-to-day experience with
transactions in the market. Instead, the customs come top-down,
dictated by a bureaucratic apparatus centered on a private legislative
body with national scope.
90
Ten years later, theory and practice have come full circle. Thanks to
ISDA's standardization work, the derivatives markets have exploded. Thanks to
ISDA's settlement infrastructure, these markets have continued to function amid
87. Chamy, supra note 76, at 845 (emphasis added).
88. Id. at 856.
89. See generally Janet Koven Levit, Bottom-Up Lawmaking: The Private
Origins of Transnational Law, 15 IND. J. GLOBAL LEGAL STUD. 49 (2008); Snyder, supra
note 77.
90. Chamy, supra note 76, at 856-57.
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the broader financial collapse. 91 Along the way, contracts-particularly
sophisticated financial boilerplate-have acquired a statutory quality, abstracted
from the contracting parties and barely accessible to their public regulators.92 And
the organization that drafts them has once again become an indispensable partner
for governments seeking their way out of a crisis.
Then and now, regulating and judging financial contracts requires an
understanding of their public purpose and the organizational agendas that drive
them. It is no longer plausible to know contracts without knowing the
"bureaucratic apparatus" that produced them. Knowing the apparatus takes
fieldwork. If Smith and King are right about the state of contract empiricism, the
organizational inquiry they propose will considerably expand its scope.
91. Role of Credit Derivatives in the U.S. Economy: Hearing Before the H.
Comm. on Agriculture, I I0th Cong. (2008) (statement of Robert Pickel, Chief Executive
Officer, ISDA), available at http://agriculture.house.gov/testimony/1 10/h81208/Pickel.pdf.
92. See generally Choi & Gulati, supra note 50.
